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and bounded rationality of investors, this paper examines their impact on the market
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sensus belief, we establish market equilibrium prices of risky assets and show that
the standard Black’s zero-beta CAPM under homogeneous beliefs holds under the
heterogeneous belief. We demonstrate that the biased belief (from the market con-
sensus belief) of investors makes their optimal portfolio not necessarily locate on the
market mean-variance frontier. We show that the traditional geometric relation of the
mean variance frontiers with and without the riskless asset under the homogeneous
beliefs does not hold under the heterogeneous beliefs. The results shed light on the
risk premium puzzle, Miller’s hypothesis, the lower market performance when the ac-
cess to the riskfree asset is impossible, and the empirical ﬁnding that managed funds
under-perform comparing to the market indices on average.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed simultaneously and indepen-
dently by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) is perhaps the most in-
ﬂuential equilibrium model in modern ﬁnance. It provides a theoretical foundation
for relating risks linearly with expected return of assets. However, the CAPM is not
without criticism, it assumes that (i) all investors make portfolio selection decisions
according to the criteria set out in Markowitz (1959) within the mean-variance frame-
work, (ii) investors have homogeneous beliefs about the future state of the market,
(iii) unlimited borrowing and lending at a single risk-free rate, and (iv) a frictionless
market. Among them, assumptions (ii) and (iii) might be the most restrictive and un-
realistic ones. To provide some theoretical explanations on the early empirical tests
of CAPM, Black (1972) has extended the CAPM by removing assumption (iii) and
developed the well-known zero-beta CAPM. By relaxing assumption (ii), Chiarella,
Dieci and He (2006a) derive a CAPM-like relationship with heterogeneous beliefs.
This paper seeks to generalize the standard CAPM by removing assumptions (ii) and
(iii) and examine the impacts of such generalization on the market equilibrium prices,
the market mean-variance frontier, and the implications to the portfolio analysis.
Literatures have made a signiﬁcant contribution to the understanding of the impact
of heterogeneous beliefs amongst investors on market equilibrium. Some have consid-
ered the problem in discrete time (for example, see Lintner (1969), Rubinstein (1976),
Fan (2003), Sun and Yang (2003), Chiarella et al (2006a) and Sharpe (2007)) and
others in continuous time (for example, see Williams (1977), Detemple and Murthy
(1994) and Zapatero (1998)). Equilibrium models have been developed to study the
impact of heterogeneity either in the mean-variance framework (see, Lintner (1969),
William (1977) and Sun and Yang (2003)) or in the Arrow-Debreu contingent claims
economy (see, for example Rubinstein (1976) and Abel (1989, 2002)). Given the
bounded rationality of investors, heterogeneity may be caused by difference in infor-
mation or difference in opinion. In the ﬁrst case, investors may update their beliefs
as new information become available, Bayesian updating rule is often used (see, for
example, Williams (1977) and Zapatero (1998)). In the second case, investor may re-
vise their portfolio strategies as their views of the market change over time (see, for
example Lintner (1969) and Rubinstein (1975)).
In the most of this literature, the impact of heterogeneous beliefs is studied for the
case of a portfolio of one risky asset and one risk-free asset. Amongst all the liter-
atures mentioned above, Lintner (1969) and Sun and Yang (2003) are the only onesPORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 3
considering market equilibrium and asset prices without assumptions (ii) and (iii) of
the traditional CAPM. Lintner (1969) is the ﬁrst paper considering the problem of
market equilibrium without assumptions (ii) and (iii). He has shown that removing
assumption (ii) does not change the structure of capital asset prices in any signiﬁcant
way, and removing assumptions (iii) further is just a mere extension of the case with
a risk-free asset. Surprisingly, this signiﬁcant contribution from Lintner has not been
paid much attention until recent years. The main obstacle in dealing with heterogene-
ity is the complexity and heavy notation involved when the number of assets and the
dimension of the heterogeneity increase. It might be due to this notational obstacle that
makes the paper of Lintner hard to follow, and renders rather complicated analysis of
the impact of heterogeneity on the market equilibrium prices. The question of whether
the zero-beta CAPM still exists without assumptions (ii) and (iii) has been studied in
Sun and Yang (2003) recently. They have provided conditions for the existence of
the market equilibrium and shown that the zero-beta CAPM still holds under hetero-
geneous beliefs within the mean-variance framework. However, because of the same
obstacle, they have not provided the market equilibrium price and examined the im-
pact of heterogeneity on the market equilibrium price, mean-variance efﬁciency of the
optimal portfolios of heterogeneous investors. This paper is devoted to overcome this
obstacle, to present an explicit equilibrium price formula, and to examine the impacts
of the heterogeneous beliefs on the market equilibrium.
Recently Chiarella et al (2006a, 2006b) introduce the concept of consensus belief
and show that, when there is a riskless asset, the market consensus belief can be con-
structed explicitly as a weighted average of the heterogeneous beliefs. They show that
theexpectedpayoffs/returnsoftheriskyassetsundertheconsensusbeliefisaweighted
average of that under investors’ subjective beliefs, while the market equilibrium prices
is a weighted average of the equilibrium prices perceived by each investor. Conse-
quently, they establish an equilibrium relation between the market consensus expected
payoff/returns of the risky assets and the market portfolio’s expected payoff/returns,
leading to a CAPM-like relation under heterogeneous beliefs. However, when there is
no riskless asset, can we obtain a zero-beta CAPM-like relation under heterogeneous
beliefs? The well known geometric tangency relation of portfolios with and without
riskless asset in the standard mean variance portfolio analysis under homogeneous be-
lief plays a very important role to the establishment of the CAPM. The question is
that, does this geometric relationship still hold under heterogeneous beliefs? This pa-
per is largely motivated by answering these two questions. We extend the analysis
in Chiarella, Dieci and He (2006a, 2006b) by removing the assumption of a risk-free4 HE AND SHI
asset and examine the impact of the heterogeneity on the market equilibrium and the
implication to the portfolio analysis.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and construct the
market consensus belief linking the heterogeneous market with an equivalent homo-
geneous market, and present an explicit market equilibrium price formula. Conse-
quently, a zero-beta CAPM under the heterogeneous beliefs is derived. In Section 3,
we examines the impacts of different aspect of heterogenous beliefs on the market
equilibrium. Through some numerical examples, Section 4 examines the implications
of heterogeneity on the efﬁciency of the optimal portfolios of heterogeneous investors
and shows that the optimal portfolios of investors is not locate on the equilibrium mar-
ket frontier in general. We show that the geometric tangency relation of the portfolios
with and without riskless asset under the standard homogeneous beliefs breaks down
under the heterogeneous beliefs. Section 5 provides an alternative heterogeneous be-
lief setup in returns and examines the robustness of the results for two different belief
setups. Section 6 extends numerical analysis to a market with many investors and
examines the impact of heterogeneity on the market when the belief dispersions are
characterized by certain distribution. Section 7 summaries and concludes the paper.
The proofs and details of some examples are provided in the appendices.
2. EQUILIBRIUM ASSET PRICES UNDER HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS
When a ﬁnancial market consists of investors with different views on the future
movement of the market, it is important to understand how market equilibrium is ob-
tained and the roles played by different investors. Within the standard mean-variance
framework, in this section, we ﬁrst introduce heterogeneous beliefs among investors
and a concept of market consensus belief to reﬂect the market belief when market is
in equilibrium. By constructing the consensus belief explicitly, we characterize the
equilibrium asset prices. Consequently we show that a zero-beta CAPM-like relation
still holds under heterogeneous beliefs.
2.1. Heterogeneous Beliefs. Following Lintner (1969) and Black (1972), we extend
the static mean-variance model with homogeneous belief and consider a market in
which there are many risky assets but there is no risk-free asset and investors have
heterogeneous beliefs of the future returns of risky assets. Similar to Chiarella et al.
(2006a), asset returns are measured in either the payoff in capital, which is considered
in this section, or the rate of return, which will be examined in Section 5.PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 5
Consider a market with N risky assets, indexed by j;k = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;N and I in-
vestors indexed by i = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;I. Let ~ x = ( ~ x1;¢¢¢ ; ~ xN)T be the random payoff
vector of the risky assets. Assume that each investor has his/her own set of beliefs
about the market in terms of means, variances and covariances of the payoffs of the
assets, denoted by
yi;j = Ei[~ xj]; ¾i;jk = Covi(~ xj; ~ xk) for 1 · i · I; 1 · j;k · N: (1)
For investor i, we deﬁne the mean vector and variance/covariance matrix of the payoffs
of N assets as follows, yi = Ei(~ x) = (yi;1;yi;2;¢¢¢ ;yi;N)T and ­i = (¾i;jk)N£N. De-
note Bi = (Ei(~ x);­i) the set of subjective beliefs of investor i. Let zi = (zi;1;zi;2;¢¢¢ ;
zi;N)T be the portfolio in the risky assets (in quantity) and Wi;o be the initial wealth of
investor i. Then the end-of-period portfolio wealth of investor i is given by ~ Wi = ~ xTzi.
Under the belief Bi of investor i, the mean and variance of ~ Wi are given, respectively,
by




i( ~ Wi) = z
T
i ­izi: (2)
As in the standard mean-variance framework, we assume that investor i has a constant
absoluteriskaversion(CARA)utilityfunctionUi(w) = ¡e¡µiw, whereµi istheCARA
coefﬁcient, and the end-of-period wealth ~ Wi of investor i is normally distributed. Un-
der these assumptions, maximizing investor i’s expected utility of wealth is equivalent
to maximizing his/her certainty equivalent end-of-period wealth maxzi Qi(zi) subject
to the wealth constraint
p
T
0zi = Wi;o; (3)
where












we obtain the following Lemma on the optimal portfolio of the investor.
Lemma 2.1. For given market price vector p0 of risky assets, the optimal risky port-
folio z¤























Lemma 2.1 implies that the optimal demand of investor i depends on his/her abso-
lute risk aversion (ARA) coefﬁcient (µi), the expected payoffs and variance/covariance6 HE AND SHI
matrix of the risky asset payoffs, the Lagrange multiplier (¸¤
i), as well as the market
price of the risky assets. Following Lintner (1969), ¸¤
i is a shadow price, measuring
the marginal real (riskless) certainty-equivalent of investor i’s end-of-period wealth.













for all j = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;N: (6)
More precisely, equation (6) indicates that ¸¤
i actually measures investor i’s optimal
marginal certainty equivalent end-of-period wealth per unit of asset j relative to its
market price and it is a constant across all assets. In general, the shadow price is not
necessary the same for all investors, however, it is the same when there exist a risk-free
asset in the market. In fact, let the current price of the risk-free asset f be 1 and its
payoff be Rf = 1 + rf. Applying (6) to the risk-free asset leads to ¸¤
i = Rf for all
investors, that is, the shadow price is equal to the payoff of the risk-free asset.
2.2. Consensus Belief and Equilibrium Asset Prices. We deﬁne the market equi-
librium asset price vector po of the risky assets as the price vector under which indi-








¹ zi := zm; (7)
where ¹ zi is the endowment portfolio of investor i. Correspondingly, zm is the market
portfoliooftheriskyassets. Itthenfollowsfrom(7)and(4)thatthemarketequilibrium






















This expression deﬁnes the market equilibrium price po implicitly since ¸¤
i depends on
po as well. For the existence of the market equilibrium price, we refer to Sun and Yang
(2003) and the references cited there. The concept of consensus belief has been used
to characterize the market when investors are heterogeneous in different context and
it is closely related to, but signiﬁcantly different from, the concept of representative
investor in classical ﬁnance literature. We now introduce the concept of consensus
belief for the market with the heterogeneous beliefs.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A belief Ba = (Ea(~ x);­a), deﬁned by the expected payoff of the risky
assets Ea(~ x) and the covariance matrix of the risky asset payoffs ­a, is called a marketPORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 7
consensus belief if the market equilibrium price under the heterogeneous beliefs is
also the market equilibrium price under the homogeneous belief Ba.
Whenaconsensusbeliefexists, themarketwithheterogeneousbeliefscanbetreated
as a market with homogeneous consensus belief and then the classical Markowtiz port-
folioanalysiscan beapplied. Due tothecomplexityofheterogeneity, the existenceand
ﬁnding of such consensus belief is a difﬁcult task in the literature. This obstacle makes
the examination of the impact of the heterogeneity difﬁcult. In the following, we con-
struct the consensus belief explicitly, from which market equilibrium prices p0 can be
determined explicitly in terms of the consensus belief. It is the explicit construction
of the consensus belief that makes it easy to examine the role of heterogeneous beliefs































































































Proposition 2.3 shows how the consensus belief can be constructed explicitly from
the heterogeneous beliefs. Under the consensus belief, the market equilibrium prices
of the risky assets are determined in the standard way no risk-free assets. Intuitively8 HE AND SHI
Proposition 2.3 indicates that the market consensus belief is a weighted average of the
heterogeneous beliefs. More precisely, the market risk tolerance (1=µa) is simply an
average of the risk tolerance of the heterogeneous investors, according to Huang and




i )¡1 is called the aggregate absolute risk aversion
and consequently µaWm0=I is referred to as the aggregate relative risk aversion. The
weighted average behaviour can also be viewed in the following way. Let ¿i = 1=µi be
the risk tolerance of investor i and ¿a =
PI




























Hence the inverse of the covariance matrix (­¡1
a ) for the market reﬂects an weighted
average of the inverse covariance matrices of all investors and the market expected
payoff is a weighted average of the covariances of the investors. The market equi-
librium prices are determined such that each investor can choose their optimal port-
folio subjectively and the market is cleared. It follows from (4) in Lemma 2.1 that
p0 = 1
¸¤
i (yi ¡ 1
¿i­iz¤
i) for i = 1;¢¢¢ ;I: However, if the entire market acts as an ag-
gregate investor, then for the market to clear, the prices must be determined by the




that the consensus belief Ba must correspond to the belief of the aggregate market such
that the market portfolio is an optimal portfolio. The expressions in Proposition 2.3
provide explicit relationships between the heterogeneous belief and the market consen-
sus belief under the market aggregation. Their usefulness will be revealed when we
derive a zero-beta CAPM-like relation and examine the impacts of the heterogeneity
on the market equilibrium in the following subsection.
2.3. The Zero-Beta CAPM under Heterogeneous Beliefs. As a corollary of Propo-
sition 2.3, we show now that a zero-beta CAPM-like relation holds under the con-
structed consensus belief with no risk-free asset.
Let the future payoff of the market portfolio zm be given by ~ Wm = ~ xTzm and its
current market value is Wm;o = zT
mp0 =
PI
i=1 Wi;o. Hence under the consensus belief
Ba, Ea( ~ Wm) = yT
azm and ¾2
a( ~ Wm) = zT
m­azm. Deﬁne the returns ~ rj = ~ xj=pj;o ¡ 1
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and
Cova(~ rj; ~ rm) =
1
pj;oWm;o
Cova(~ xj; ~ Wm); Cova(~ rj; ~ rk) =
1
pj;opk;o
Cova(~ xj; ~ xj):
Then we have the following result.
Corollary 2.4. In market equilibrium, the relation between expected return and risk
under the heterogeneous beliefs can be expressed as
Ea[~ r] ¡ (¸
¤
a ¡ 1)1 = ¯[Ea(~ rm) ¡ (¸
¤










Ea(~ rm) ¡ (¸
¤









a(~ rm) > 0 (17)
and ¯ = (¯1;¯2;¢¢¢ ;¯N)T with
¯j =






Cova(~ xj; ~ Wm)
¾2
a;m
; j = 1;¢¢¢ ;N:
The equilibrium relation (15) is the standard Zero-Beta CAPM except that the mean
and variance/covariance are calculated based on the consensus belief Ba. We refer it
as the Zero-beta Heterogeneous Capital Asset Pricing Model (ZHCAPM). For risky
assets, relation (15) is equivalent to
Ea[~ rj] ¡ (¸
¤
a ¡ 1) = ¯j[Ea(~ rm) ¡ (¸
¤
a ¡ 1)]; for j = 1;¢¢¢ ;N: (18)
The zero-beta rate, ¸¤
a¡1, corresponds to the expected return of the zero-beta portfolio
of the market portfolio, where ¸¤
a is the market shadow price. As in the standard
case, the market risk premium, given by equation (17) is positively proportional to
the aggregate relative risk aversion Wm;o=¿a and the variance of the market portfolio
returns ¾2
a(~ rm). The market price of risk under the consensus belief is given by Á =
(Ea(~ rm) ¡ (¸¤
a ¡ 1))=¾a(~ rm) = Wm0¾(~ rm)=¿a, which is proportional to the level of
volatility of the market and the aggregate relative risk aversion.
As discussed earlier, investor i’s shadow price becomes Rf across all investors when
there exists a risk-free asset in the market. That is, ¸¤
i = ¸¤
a = Rf. Substituting this
into Proposition 2.3 and Corollary 2.4 leads to the main results in Chiarella et al.
(2006a).10 HE AND SHI
3. THE IMPACT OF HETEROGENEITY
In this section, we use Proposition 2.3 and Corollary 2.4 to examine the impact of
the heterogeneous beliefs on the market consensus belief and equilibrium price. To
simplify the analysis, we focus on some special cases.
3.1. The Shadow Prices and the Aggregation Property. We ﬁrst examine the re-
lationship between individual shadow prices and the market consensus shadow price.










I > 0, showing that the market consensus shadow price increases as the














i @µi < 0. Therefore the market
consensus shadow price is more sensitive to the change of the shadow price of investor
who is less risk-averse.
According to Huang and Litzenberger (1988), the market satisﬁes the aggregation
property when the market equilibrium prices are independent of the distribution of the
initial wealth among investors. Huang and Litzenberger (1988) show that the aggrega-
tion property holds when investors have homogeneous belief, time-additive and state
independent utility functions with linear risk tolerance and a common cautiousness
coefﬁcient. In a general two-period economy without specifying the type of utility
function for any investors, Fan (2003) shows the Second Welfare Theorem holds. The
theoremstatesthatinvestorswithlargecapitalendowmentswouldhavelowermarginal
utilities of capital endowments and a stronger inﬂuence on the market equilibrium. In
our case, the utility is measured by Qi(z). From (6), the marginal utility of investor i is
represented by the shadow price (¸¤
i). It then follows from (5) that a large initial wealth
or capital endowment leads to a lower marginal utility. Also, from the expression of
the equilibrium price vector in (8), it can be seen that (¸¤
i) is inversely related to the
price vector. This suggests that an investor with a lower shadow price or marginal util-
ity has a stronger impact on the market equilibrium prices, and hence an investor with
a larger capital is more inﬂuential in the market. This is consistent with the Second
Welfare Theorem. In other words, the aggregation property does not hold in our case
in general. However, if there is a risk-free asset in the market, then the shadow prices
or marginal utilities is a constant across all investor. Correspondingly the market prices
are independent of the initial wealth distribution. Summarizing the above analysis, we
have the following Corollary.PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 11
Corollary 3.1. With the heterogeneous beliefs and no risk-free asset, the aggregation
property does not hold. Furthermore investors with lower shadow prices or marginal
utilities have a stronger impact on the market equilibrium prices, and hence investors
with larger capital are more inﬂuential in the market. However, if there is a risk-free
asset, the aggregation property holds.
3.2. The Impact of Heterogeneous ARA Coefﬁcients. Proposition 2.3 indicates
that the heterogeneous ARA coefﬁcients or risk tolerance have complicated impact
on the market consensus belief and equilibrium price. To illustrate such impact, we
consider a special case when investors are homogeneous in the expected payoffs and
covariance matrix but heterogeneous in ARA, that is, ­i = ­a := ­o;yi = ya := yo



















Equation (19) implies that, when the risk aversion coefﬁcient is the only source of
heterogeneity, the market equilibrium prices are independent of the initial wealth dis-
tribution amongst individuals and hence the aggregation property holds, a well-known




































i ) < 0, the above analysis leads to the following
Corollary.
























@µi = 0 for ¯j = 0. The rate of change for both the
equilibrium price and expected return is greater when investor is less risk averse.12 HE AND SHI
Corollary 3.2 indicates that the impact of ARA on the market equilibrium depends
on the beta of the asset. When there is no risk-free asset, if an asset is more risky than
the market (¯j > 1), an increase in ARA for any investor increases asset’s price and
decreases the expected future returns, and vice versa for a less risky asset. However, if
there is a risk-free asset, the changes depend on the return correlation of the asset with
the market. If the returns of the asset and market are positive correlated, an increase
(decrease) in ARA of any investor leads to lower (higher) market equilibrium price and
higher (lower) expected return for the asset. In addition, changing ARA of less risk
averse investor has more signiﬁcant impact on market equilibrium price and expected
return. The market is dominated by less risk averse investors, because the market
average risk aversion coefﬁcient µa is a harmonic mean of µis, it aggravates the impact
of the small µis. This suggests that when the risk aversion coefﬁcients of the investors
becomes more divergent with the average unchanged, the aggregate ARA would be
reduced, resulting lower (higher) equilibrium price and higher (lower) expected return
for assets with betas are below (above) the market level when there is no risk-free
asset in the market. However, when there is a risk-free asset, the reduction of the
market aggregate risk aversion leads to lower (higher) equilibrium price and higher
(lower) expected return for assets that are negatively (positively) correlated with the
market.
3.3. The Impact of Heterogeneous Expected Payoffs. We now assume that in-
vestors agree on the variances and covariances of asset payoffs, say ­i = ­o, but
disagree on the expected future payoffs of the assets. Consequently ­a = ­o and the















m­ozm=¿a]=Wm0 and ya;j =
PI
i=1(¿i=¿a)yi;j. This, together








where ®j = p0;jzm;j=Wm0 is the market share of asset j in wealth. If there is a risk-
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Because of ® 2 [0;1], equations (21) and (22) indicates that investor i’s subjective
belief in the expected payoff of asset j is positively related to its equilibrium price.
This is also true when there is a risk-free asset in the market. The positive correlation
betweenthesubjectivebeliefsintheexpectedpayoffandtheequilibriumpriceforasset
j does not necessarily lead to a negative correlation between the subjective beliefs
in the expected payoff and the market expected return for asset j. To see the exact









This expression is negative if and only if (1 + Ea(~ rj))(1 ¡ ®j) > ¸¤
a. When this
condition holds, the expected return decreases when the expected payoff increases
for asset j. When there is a risk-free asset, ¸¤





o;j , which is negative if and only if Ea(~ rj) > rf. When this condi-
tionholds, theexpectedreturndecreaseswhentheheterogeneousbeliefintheexpected
payoff increases for asset j. Summarizing the above analysis, we obtain the following
Corollary.
Corollary 3.3. In a market with homogeneous beliefs in covariance matrix and no
risk-free assets, if
(1 + Ea(~ rj))(1 ¡ ®j) > ¸
¤
a (24)
for asset j, then the market expected payoff increases and the expected return de-
creases when the heterogeneous belief in the expected payoff of any investor increases
for asset j. When there is a risk-free asset, the condition (24) becomes Ea(~ rj) > rf.
The following discussion is devoted to Miller’s hypothesis (Miller (1977)) that as-
sertswithhighdispersioninbeliefshavehighermarketpriceandlowerexpectedfuture
return than otherwise similar stocks. Empirical tests performed in Diether, Malloy and
Scherbina (2002) support Miller’s hypothesis. Intuitively, optimistic investors would
increase the price of the asset and then reduce its expected future returns. However,
there is a lack of theoretical modeling and explanation on this hypothesis. Let us con-
sider a market in which investors have homogeneous beliefs in the covariance matrix
but heterogeneous beliefs in the expected payoffs of two risky assets j and j0. Let the
expected payoffs be yj = (y1;j;y2;j;¢¢¢ ;yI;j)T and yj0 = (y1;j0;y2;j0;¢¢¢ ;yI;j0)T for
asset j and j0, respectively. Assume yi;j0 = yi;j+²i;j, where f²j;1;²j;2;¢¢¢ ;²j;Ig is a set
of real numbers such that
Pn
i=1 ²i;j = 0 and 1
I
PI
i=1(yi;j0 ¡ ¹ y)2 ¸ 1
I
PI
i=1(yi;j ¡ ¹ y)2;
where ¹ y = (1=I)
PI
i=1 yi;j. This condition means that investors have more divergence14 HE AND SHI
of opinions in the expected payoff for asset j0 than asset j. According to Miller’s hy-
pothesis, asset j0 would have higher market price and lower expected future return than
asset j. To see if this is true, we consider the following simple example when I = 2.
Example 3.4. Let I = 2. Given ² > 0, consider two assets j and k with y2;j <
y1;j, and y1;k = y1;j + ² and y2;k = y2;j ¡ ². This speciﬁcation indicates that the
divergence of opinion about the asset’s expected payoff is greater for asset k than
































1 ). Accordingly, ya;j <
ya;k if and only if µ1 < µ2. This implies that if investor who is optimistic about the
asset expected payoff is less risk averse, then a divergence of opinion among the two
investors for the expected payoff for asset k leads to high expected payoff for the asset
in equilibrium. This suggests that divergence of opinion on the asset expected payoffs
generates higher market expected payoff if belief of assets’ expected future payoffs is
negatively correlated to risk aversion for any investor i. It then follows from Corollary
3.3 that, when both assets j and k satisfy the condition (24), the divergence of opinion
on the asset expected payoffs generates lower expected future return for the asset.
To summarize, if our model is to be consistent with Miller’s hypothesis that diver-
gence of opinion causes asset price to increase and expected return to decrease, we
need the investor with an optimistic view of the asset future payoff to be less risk-
averse comparing with the relative pessimistic investor, also the asset return satisﬁes
condition (24).
4. THE IMPLICATIONS ON THE PORTFOLIO FRONTIER AND THE OPTIMAL
PORTFOLIOS
In this section, we examine the mean-variance efﬁciency of the optimal portfolios
of investors when the market is in equilibrium. Following the standard Markowitz
method, we can construct the mean variance portfolio frontier based on the consensus
belief. Becausetheconsensusbeliefreﬂectsthemarketbeliefwhenitisinequilibrium,
we call this frontier the market equilibrium frontier. A portfolio is (in)efﬁcient if it is
(not) located on the market equilibrium frontier. When investors are homogeneous
in their beliefs, it is well known that the investors will always choose an efﬁcient
portfolio. Furthermore, there exists a unique tangency portfolio between frontiers with
and without a riskless security. The question is that whether these results still true
when investors have heterogeneous beliefs? In this section, we provide a negativePORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 15
answer to the above question by considering ﬁrst the market without risk-free asset
and then comparing with the market with a risk-free asset.
4.1. Efﬁciency of the Optimal Portfolios under Heterogeneous Beliefs without
Risk-free Asset. In the market we set up in Section 2, investors are bounded rational
in the sense that they make their optimal decisions based on their beliefs. Based on
investors’ subjective beliefs, we can construct the mean-variance frontiers (in the stan-
dard deviation and expected return space) by using the standard Markwitz method. Of
course, the optimal portfolios of the investors will be located on the efﬁcient mean-
variance frontiers under their own beliefs. Similarly, based on the consensus belief,
the market equilibrium frontier can be constructed. By the market clearing condition
and frontier construction, the market portfolio is always located on the market equilib-
rium frontier, hence always efﬁcient. The question is whether the optimal portfolios
of individual investors are located on the market equilibrium frontier. This is a very
important question both theoretically and empirically. If the answer to the question is
yes, then the optimal portfolio of the bounded rational heterogeneous investors are efﬁ-
cient under market aggregation. Otherwise, market fails to provide the mean-variance
efﬁciency for the investors. If we refer to heterogeneous investors as fund managers
and the market portfolio as the market index, the efﬁciency of the optimal portfolios
will have important implication on whether fund managers can out perform the market
index based on the mean-variance criteria.
To answer this question, we consider a consensus investor with the market consen-
sus beliefs Ba, risk aversion coefﬁcient µi and initial wealth Wi;o. Then the optimal


























Equation (25) shows that any consensus investor will divide his/her investment into
two portfolios, namely, ­¡1
a ya and the market portfolio zm, which is consistent with
the Two Fund Separation Theorem (See Huang and Lizenberger (1988) Chapter 4,
page 83) and such portfolios must be mean-variance efﬁcient due to the construction,
which means that the portfolios ­¡1
a ya and zm must be the frontier portfolios. It is easy
to verify from (25) that the aggregate position of the portfolio ­¡1









a ya = 0 when the market clearing condition (7) is satisﬁed.16 HE AND SHI
However, when investor i’s subjective belief (Bi) differs from the market belief (Ba),






























Then the composition of the portfolio depends also on the belief error yi ¡ ya of the
investor i from the market. Analytically it is not easy to see if the optimal portfolio
of investor i lies on the market equilibrium frontier. However, through Example F.1
in Appendix F, we can show that the optimal portfolios of investors are not located
on the market equilibrium frontier in general. In this example, we consider a market
with two investors and three risky assets. Given individuals’ risk aversion coefﬁcients,
subjectivebeliefsandinitialwealth, weﬁrstformtheconsensusbeliefandcalculatethe
equilibrium price vector. Using the equilibrium price, we convert the consensus belief
in asset payoffs to the consensus belief in asset returns and obtain the market expected
returns and variances/covariances of asset returns. With the information provided in
Table 3 in Appendix F, we can construct the portfolio frontiers for each investor and
for the market equilibrium frontier in the mean-standard deviation space, and locate
the optimal portfolios for individual investors as well as the market portfolio. Figure 1
exhibits the resulting graph.
Figure 1 shows two interesting and important features. Firstly, the market equilib-
rium portfolio frontier is located between two individual’s frontiers. However, it is
closer to that of investor 2. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that investor 2 is less risk
averse and more optimistic about the market in the sense that he/she perceives higher
expected payoffs and smaller standard deviations on the asset payoffs, hence he/she
dominates the market. Secondly, it is veriﬁed that the optimal portfolios of the two
investors are always located on their portfolio efﬁcient frontiers based on their own
beliefs and the market portfolio is located on the market efﬁcient frontier under the
consensus belief. However, in market equilibrium, the optimal portfolios of the two
investors are strictly below the market equilibrium frontier. This may be hard to view
in Figure 1. We provide a zoom-in version in Figure 2 to verify this observation.
Figure 2 clearly shows that the optimal portfolios of the two investors are not lo-
cated on the frontier, though they are very close to it, and hence are inefﬁcient. Intu-
itively, since both investors made “wrong guesses” about the market, investor 1 being
pessimistic and investor 2 being optimistic, their optimal portfolios suffer from those
“wrong guesses” in terms of mean-variance efﬁciency.PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 17
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FIGURE 1. The mean variance frontiers under the heterogeneous beliefs and
the market equilibrium consensus beliefs. The tangency line corresponding to
the consensus belief has the market portfolio as the tangency portfolio and the
expected return of the zero-beta portfolio of the market as the intercept with
the expected return axis.
Sharpe (2007) simulates market trading using his latest program APSIM, the pro-
gram assumes a risk-free asset and there is a true probability distribution of future
states of the market. Although not directly compatible due to the different setups,
Sharpe’s ﬁndings
1 are consistent with ours. That is the market portfolio outperforms
most of other portfolios in terms of mean-variance efﬁciency, superior fund managers
can only at their best perform as well as the market portfolio. However, under our
model, the “true” probability distribution of the future depends on the heterogeneous
1Sharpe shows in Chapter 6, case 18, that superior fund manager who makes the “correct guesses” about
the future of the market (meaning their probability assessment of the future coincide with the hypothet-
ical true probability assessment) has a Sharpe Ratio (of 0:367) slightly above the market’s value (of
0:366), other investors who make the “wrong guess” (meaning that their probability assessment of the
future differs the hypothetical true probability assessment) are mostly penalized in terms of efﬁciency
(with the lowest Sharpe Ratio of 0:237). However a lucky investor still has the same Sharpe Ratio (of
0:367) as the superior fund managers.18 HE AND SHI
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FIGURE 2. Close-up of the locations of individuals’ optimal portfolios and
the market portfolio relative to the market frontier when the market is in equi-
librium.
beliefs of the investors. Sharpe (2007) explains the inferior performance of the active
fund managers in the long run compare to the index funds by higher cost of active
managers. To add to this, we suggest that it might be simply because it is very difﬁ-
cult for active mangers to consistently make correct predictions about the future, while
index funds tracks the market portfolio, which is always mean-variance efﬁcient. We
conclude this numerical example by amending Sharpe’s Index Fund Premise(IFP) to
be as follows,
IFPa Few of us are as smart as all of us.
IFPb Few of us are as smart as all of us, and it is hard to identify such people in
advance.
IFPc Few of us are as smart as all of us, and it is hard to identify such people in
advance, and they deﬁnitely
2 charge more than they are worth.
Because no optimal portfolio is mean-variance efﬁcient unless the individual’s belief
coincides to the consensus belief, hence no one can beat the market portfolio when the
market is in equilibrium.
2It reads “may” in Sharpe’s bookPORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 19
4.2. TheGeometricRelationoftheMarketEquilibriumFrontierswithandwith-
out Risk-free Asset. To examine the tangency relationship of the traditional portfolio
theory with heterogeneous beliefs, we consider the situation under which a riskless
asset exists with future payoff Rf. Under the homogeneous belief, the classic portfolio
theory tells us that the efﬁcient portfolio frontier collapses to a straight line when a
risk-free asset is added to the market. This straight line has one tangency point with
the original frontier without a risk-free asset. This tangency portfolio is exactly the
market portfolio when both the bond and equity markets clear. We now examine this
equilibrium tangency relationship under heterogeneous beliefs through the following
example.
Example 4.1. Consider the case with I = 2 investors with beliefs Bi = (­i;yi)
for i = 1;2. There are N = 3 risky assets and a risk-free asset with payoff Rf.
Let the absolute risk aversion coefﬁcients (µ1;µ2) = (5;1), investors’ initial wealth
W1;o = W2;o = $10, market endowment of risky assets zm = (1;1;1)T, and yo =
















in which Do corresponds to the standard deviation matrix and C is the correlation
matrix. Investors’ beliefs are given by yi = (1 + ±i)yo and ­i = DiCDi, where
Di = (1 + ²i)Do for i = 1;2. This implies that investors agrees on the correlation of
asset payoffs, but disagreeabout the volatility and expectedpayoffs. Nextwe aggregate
individuals’ beliefs according to Proposition 2.3, ﬁrst without a risk-free asset, then
with a risk-free asset. The risk-free payoff Rf is determined such that the risk-free
asset is in net-zero supply in equilibrium. To examine the tangency relationship, we
plot the portfolio frontiers and optimal portfolios under the market consensus belief
with and without risk-free asset for different values of ±i and ²i. Plots are shown in
Figure 3.
When investors are homogeneous about the variances and covariances but heteroge-
neousabout the expectedpayoffsof the riskyasset, Figure 3(a1) and (a2) showthat the
tangency relation still holds. This is not surprising because of the homogeneous belief
of the variance-covariance matrix ­i = ­o, the consensus variance-covariance matrix
is given by ­a = ­o. From the construction of the consensus belief, the expected pay-
off ya is a risk tolerance weighted average of the heterogeneous beliefs in the expected20 HE AND SHI
(a1) (±1;±2) = (0:2;0) (a2) (±1;±2) = (0;0:2)
(a3) (²1;²2) = (¡0:2;0) (a4) (²1;²2) = (0;¡0:2)
FIGURE 3. Comparethegeometricrelationshipsbetweenmarketport-
folio frontiers with and without a risk-free asset, when the risk-free as-
set is in net-zero supply. In (a1) and (a2), y1 6= y2;­1 = ­2; in (a3)
and (a4), y1 = y2;­1 6= ­2 with
payoffs. Therefore, the consensus belief Ba remains the same when a risk-free asset
is added to the market. Furthermore, since the risk-free asset is in net-zero supply, it































Consequently, the riskless payoff Rf must equal to the zero-beta payoff ¸¤
a. This im-
plies that both the market’s optimal marginal certainty equivalent wealth (CEW) and
the equilibrium prices do not change when a risk-free asset is added to the market.
Therefore the tangency relationship of the two market equilibrium frontiers with and
without a risk-free asset holds with the market portfolio as the tangency portfolio.
However, the efﬁciency of the optimal portfolios of the two investors depends on theirPORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 21
expectations and risk aversion coefﬁcients. On the one hand, when the more risk
averse investor is optimistic and the less risk averse investor is pessimistic about the
expected payoffs, intuitively this might not be the situation that one expects, Fig. 3
(a1) indicates that the optimal portfolios of both investors are located closer to the
market portfolio and market frontiers. On the other hand, when the more risk averse
investor is pessimistic and the less risk averse investor is optimistic about the expected
payoffs, intuitively this might be the situation that one expects, Fig. 3 (a2) indicates
that the optimal portfolios of both investors are located far away from the market port-
folio and the equilibrium market frontiers, in particular, the optimal portfolio of the
pessimistic investor may become inefﬁcient, even more inefﬁcient when the risk-free
asset is available with lower expected return than the risk-free rate. This means that
adding a risk-free asset in this situation may help investor 2 to achieve a higher ex-
pected return for his optimal portfolio by sacriﬁcing the mean-variance efﬁciency of
the optimal portfolio of investor 1.
When investors are heterogeneous in the variances of the asset payoffs but homo-
geneous in their expected payoffs, Figure 3 (a3) and (a4) illustrate that the tangency
relation breaks down. The risk-free payoff is no longer guaranteed to equal to the
zero-beta payoff, which results in a change in the market’s optimal CEW and also the
equilibrium prices. In particular, when the relative less risk averse investor, investor
2 in this case, is more conﬁdent (measured by the smaller variances), Figure 3 (a4)
indicates that the existence of a risk-free asset actually pushes up the mean variance
frontier, leading to higher expected return for the market portfolio. If one would be-
lieve that it is more likely that the less risk averse investor would be more conﬁdent
in general, this implies that adding a risk-free asset would be more likely to push the
portfolio frontier line above the tangency line of the frontier without the risk-free asset,
leading to a higher market expected return. This observation would help us to explain
the risk premium puzzle. However, when the relative more risk averse investor, in-
vestor 1 in this case, is more conﬁdent, Figure 3 (a3) implies that the existence of a
risk-free asset actually pushes down the mean variance frontier, lowing the expected
return of the market portfolio. This is an unexpected and surprising result. In the stan-
dard homogeneous case, the expected return of the market portfolio is independent of
the existence of the risk-free asset which is in zero-net supply. The above analysis
demonstrates that this is no longer the case when investors are heterogeneous. A re-
striction to the access of the risk-free security may lead to a lower market expected
return, a phenomena we are experiencing now in the current ﬁnancial crisis, and we
leave the detailed discussion along this line to future research.22 HE AND SHI
5. THE IMPACT OF THE HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS IN ASSET RETURNS
In our discussion so far, the heterogeneous beliefs are formed in terms of asset pay-
offs, rather than asset returns as one may argue is the more accurate measure of return.
One may also wonder if the different way in forming the heterogeneous beliefs would
lead to different results. In this section, we examine the impact on the market and port-
folio analysis when the heterogeneous beliefs are formed in returns. To be consistent
with previous sections, we let Ei(~ r) be the expected asset returns vector and Vi be the
variance/covariance matrix of asset returns for investor i. Denote Bi = (Ei(~ r);Vi) as
the subjective beliefs of investor i, and let ¼i = (¼i;1;¼i;2 ¢¢¢ ;¼i;I)T be the portfolio
of investor i in dollar amount, and Wi;0 be the initial wealth of investor i.
5.1. Individual’s Portfolio Selection. By assuming each investor’s wealth is normal
distributed, investor i’s end-of-period expected utility maximization problem becomes
max¼i Qi(¼i) subject to the wealth constraint ¼T
i 1 = Wi;0, where ¹i = Ei(~ ri) + 1
and Qi(¼) = ¹T
i ¼i ¡
µi
2 ¼iVi¼i is the certainty equivalent end-of-period wealth of
investor i in terms of his dollar investment in each asset. Similar to the payoff setup in












i 1 (see Appendix D for the
proof). Clearly, ¸¤
i = @Qi(¼¤
i)=@¼i;j is still the shadow price of investor i, however
it’s meaning is slightly different in the sense that ¸¤
i is the optimal marginal certainty
equivalent end-of-period wealth per dollar investment in asset j for investor i. It is the
same across all risky assets, but different across different investors. Obviously, if there
exists a risk-free asset (f) with return rf, then it must be true that ¸¤
i = 1 + rf = Rf
for all investors .
5.2. The Consensus Belief, Market Equilibrium, and the Zero-Beta CAPM. We
now show that a consensus belief can be constructed in the newly deﬁned market under
new market aggregate condition ¼m =
PI
i=1 ¼¤
i with Wm;o = ¼T
m1. In this case the









i (¹i ¡ ¸
¤
i1); (27)
where Z is an N £ N diagonal matrix with diagonal elements zj representing the
market supply in absolute number of shares of asset j. It turns out that we can still
construct a consensus belief such that, if held by all investors, it generates the same
equilibrium price vector as in equation (27).PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 23













































; Ea(~ r) = ¹a ¡ 1; (29)






a (¹a ¡ ¸
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a1); (30)
(iii) let­i = P0ViP0 andyi = P0Ei(~ r)whereP0 = Diag(p0), thentheequilibrium












where ya and ­a are calculated as in Proposition 2.3;
(iv) the Zero-beta CAPM relation
Ea[~ r] ¡ (¸
¤
a ¡ 1)1 = ¯[Ea(~ rm) ¡ (¸a ¡ 1)]; (32)
holds, where
¯ = (¯1;¯2;¢¢¢ ;¯N)
T; ¯j =
Cova(~ rm; ~ rj)
¾2
a(~ rm)
; j = 1;¢¢¢ ;N:
Therefore, we see from Proposition 5.1 that both equilibrium and a consensus belief
also exist if we allow investors to form their beliefs in terms of asset return instead of
asset payoffs. However, this set up in asset returns has some advantages; (i) since the
shadow price ¸¤
i no longer depends on the equilibrium prices, the equilibrium price
vector can now be solved explicitly, which is a computational convenience; (ii) ZH-
CAPMcanbederivedinamuchsimplermanner(seeAppendixE).Wenowinvestigate
the differentimpact this setup has on marketequilibrium in comparison with the payoff
setup.
5.3. The Impact on the Market and Comparison for Both Setups. In this subsec-
tion, we aim to illustrate the different impact of heterogeneity on the market efﬁcient
portfolio frontiers and individual optimal portfolios when investors form their beliefs24 HE AND SHI
in terms of rate of returns instead of payoffs. Similarly, we examine the optimal port-
folios and the tangency relation of the market equilibrium frontiers with and without
risk-free asset through an numerical example detailed in Example F.2 in Appendix F.
(b1) (±1;±2) = (0:2;0) (b2) (±1;±2) = (0;0:2)
(b3) (²1;²2) = (¡0:1;0) (b4) (²1;²2) = (0;¡0:1)
FIGURE 4. Compare the optimal and market portfolios and geometric
relationships of market equilibrium frontiers with and without a risk-
free asset when the risk-free asset is in net-zero supply and investors
form their beliefs in terms of asset returns.
Comparing Figure 3 for payoff setup and Figure 4 for the return setup, we observe
some interesting similarities and differences. (i) When investors are homogeneous in
covariances but heterogeneous in the means, for both setups and with/without riskless
asset, the optimal portfolios of the two investors are not located on the market frontiers,
though they can be very close to the frontiers, as indicated by comparing Figure 4 (b1)
and (b2) to Figure 3 (a1) and (a2). Also, the tangency relation of the equilibrium
market frontiers with and without riskless asset still holds. In addition, when there is
a risk-free asset, the optimal portfolio are located much further apart from the marketPORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 25
portfolio, in particular, for the optimal portfolio of investor who is relatively more
risk averse but pessimistic in his/her belief in expected returns (payoffs), see Figure 3
(a2) and Figure 4 (b2). In other words, both setups of the heterogeneity in mean have
very similar impact. (ii) When the investors have heterogeneous beliefs in variances,
there is a signiﬁcant difference between two setups, comparing Figures 4 (b3) and (b4)
to Figures 3 (a3) and (a4). In the return setup, heterogeneity asset volatility has a
signiﬁcantly greater impact on the portfolio frontiers and the mean-variance efﬁciency
of optimal portfolios. Adding a risk-free asset can push the equilibrium market frontier
line far above to the tangency line of the frontier without risk-free asset, leading to a
much higher market expected return. The optimal portfolios of the two investors also
beneﬁt signiﬁcantly by adding a risk-free asset. The gain of the market expected return
by adding a riskless asset can be one of potential explanations on the risk premium
puzzle and the reduction of the market expected return by restriction of access to the
riskless security could be used to explain market returns of the current bear market and
ﬁnancial crisis.
6. THE IMPACT OF HETEROGENEITY ON THE MARKET WITH MANY INVESTORS
From the traditional portfolio theory under homogeneous beliefs, we know that all
investors hold portfolios located on the market’s efﬁcient frontier, which is a hyperbola
when there is no riskless asset and a straight line connecting the risk-free asset and the
market portfolio, which is called the Capital Market Line (CML). When investors are
heterogeneous, we have shown through numerical examples of three assets and two
investors in the previous sections that investors no longer held portfolios on the equi-
librium market frontier unless investors held the market consensus belief. Essentially,
this is due to the fact that the consensus belief is determined endogenously by the het-
erogeneous beliefs and no individual knows the consensus belief in advance. In this
section, we extend the analysis in the previous sections to a market consisting of many
different investors and we want to see whether those features observed for the market
with two investors also hold for the market with many investors. To characterize the
beliefs of the investors, we assume that investors’ beliefs follow a certain probability
distribution, noise in the beliefs can be either additive or multiplicative, univariate or
multivariate. For consistency, we consider multiplicative noise for the payoff setup and
additive noise for the return setup. This provides us with four possible cases, we use
numerical examples to examine the efﬁciency of the optimal portfolios of investors,
their relative position to the CML, and the difference between two setups.26 HE AND SHI
(c1) Heterogeneity in expected payoffs (¾±i;¾²i) = (0:2;0).
(c2) Heterogeneity in variances (¾±i;¾²i) = (0;0:03).
FIGURE 5. The optimal portfolios of all the 50 investors and their
relative position to the CML when investors’ beliefs in terms of asset
payoffs is homogeneous in variances and heterogeneous in expected
payoffs in (c1) or homogeneous in expected payoffs and heterogeneous
in variances in (c2). The left (right) panels correspond to univariate
(multivariate) distribution in beliefs.
In our ﬁrst example (see Example F.3 in Appendix F for the details), we consider
the payoff setup and the market with three risky assets and a risk-free asset and 50
investors. We assume that all 50 investors who agree on the correlation matrix in
both setups of the beliefs. Beliefs dispersions in expected payoffs are multiplicative.
In the ﬁrst case, each investor’s belief dispersion is driven by a univariate, normally
distributed noise. But in the second case, the dispersion is driven by multivariate,
normally distributed noise for each investor. The results for the two cases are plotted in
Figure 5 in which the optimal portfolios of all 50 investors and their relative position toPORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 27
the CML are plotted. Figure 5(c1) illustrates the case when investors are homogeneous
in variances but heterogeneous in the expected payoffs, while Figure 5(c2) illustrates
the case other way around. The left panels correspond to the case with univariate noise
and the right panels correspond to the case with multivariate noise. Figure 5 leads to
the following interesting observations. (i) The optimal portfolios of all investors are
almost on the CML when investors are heterogeneous in variances but homogeneous
in the expected payoffs, illustrated by Figure 5(c2). The same effect is observed with
multivariate noise (right panel) as for univariate noise (left panel). This shows that
heterogeneity in covariances plays insigniﬁcant role for the efﬁciency of the optimal
portfolios of investors. (ii) The heterogeneity in expected payoff has signiﬁcant impact
on the location of the optimal portfolios of the investors, illustrated in Figure 5(c1).
The optimal portfolios become less efﬁcient, in particular, when the belief dispersions
are multivariate normally distributed (the right panel). Some optimal portfolios are
far below the CML, even have lower expected return than the risk free rate (the left
panel). In addition, when the belief dispersions are univariate, the optimal portfolios
seem to form a hyperbolic curve under the equilibrium market efﬁcient frontier (the
left panel). However, when the divergence of opinions are not the same for each asset,
optimal portfolios are scattered under the frontier without any signiﬁcant pattern. This
example shows that heterogeneity in expected payoff has more signiﬁcant impact on
the efﬁciency of optimal portfolios of investors than the heterogeneity in variances.
In our second example (see Example F.4 in Appendix F for the details) we consider
a similar situation but with the return setup. The belief dispersions are additive (which
is normal for case (iii) and multi-variate normal for case (iv)). The results are reported
in Figure 6. Comparing Figure 6 (d1) to Figure 5(c1), we see a similar impact of the
heterogeneity in the expected returns on the optimal portfolios to the payoff setup.
However, in comparing Figure 6 (d2) to Figure 5(c2), we notice that the impact of the
heterogeneity of variances are very different from the payoff setup, especially when
²is are multivariate normally distributed (the right panel). For the return setup, many
of investors’ optimal portfolios are far below the equilibrium frontier compared to the
payoff set up, leading to lower Sharpe ratios.
Based on the above two examples with many investors and two setups in beliefs, we
ﬁnd that heterogeneity in expected payoff/returns has signiﬁcant impact on the optimal
portfolios of investors than the heterogeneity in variances. Also, different distribution
of the beliefs has different impact. Between twosetups in beliefs, the return setup leads
the optimal portfolios of investors to be less efﬁcient than the payoff setup. Overall, we
can see that, due to the heterogeneous beliefs, the market fails to provide investors with28 HE AND SHI
(d1) Heterogeneity in the expected returns (¾±i;¾²i) = (0:2;0).
(d2) Heterogeneity in the variances (¾±i;¾²i) = (0;0:03).
FIGURE 6. The optimal portfolios of all the 50 investors and their
relative position to the CML when investors’ beliefs in terms of as-
set returns is homogeneous in variances and heterogeneous in expected
payoffs in (d1) and homogeneous in expected payoffs and heteroge-
neous in variances in (d2). The left panels are when (±i;²i) are univari-
ate random variables, the right-panels are when (±i;²i) are multivariate
random variables.
efﬁcient portfolio, this generic feature is not what we would expect in a homogeneous
market. It shows that heterogeneous investors can never beat the market when the
performance is measured by the Sharpe ratio.
Finally, we examine the tangency relation once again for the market with many in-
vestors through an example under the return setup (see Example F.5 in Appendix F for
details). The result is illustrated in Figure 7. One can see that without a riskless secu-
rity the optimal portfolios of the investors are grouped much closer together, especiallyPORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 29
(e1) Heterogeneity in the expected returns (¾±i;¾²i) = (0:2;0).
(e2) Heterogeneity in the variances (¾±i;¾²i) = (0;0:03).
FIGURE 7. The optimal portfolios of all the 50 investors and their
relative position to the CML in a market with a risk-free asset and in a
market without a risk-free asset. Investors’ beliefs in terms of asset re-
turns is homogeneous in variances and heterogeneous in expected pay-
offs in (d1) and homogeneous in expected payoffs and heterogeneous
in variances in (d2). The left panels are when (±i;²i) are univariate ran-
domvariables, theright-panelsarewhen(±i;²i)aremultivariaterandom
variables.
when the investors’ divergence of opinion about future returns are the same across all
stocks. The tangency relation holds when investors have heterogeneous beliefs about
the expected future returns but homogeneous beliefs on the covariance matrix. How-
ever it no longer holds when beliefs in the varainces/covariances of asset returns are
heterogeneous, and adding a risk-free asset in zero-net supply to the market can im-
prove the expected return of the market portfolio signiﬁcantly.30 HE AND SHI
7. CONCLUSION
Within the mean-varianceframework, by assuming that investorsare heterogeneous,
this paper examines the impact of the heterogeneity on the market equilibrium prices
and equilibrium mean-variance portfolio frontier in a market with many risky assets
and no riskless asset. The heterogeneity is measured by the risk aversion coefﬁcients,
expected payoffs/returns, and variance/covariance matrices of risky assets of hetero-
geneous investors. Investors are bounded rational in the sense that, based on their
beliefs, they make their optimal portfolio decisions. To characterize the market equi-
librium prices of the risky assets, we introduce the concept of consensus belief of
the market and show how the consensus or market belief can be constructed from
the heterogeneous beliefs. Basically, under the market aggregation, the consensus
belief is a weighted average of the heterogeneous beliefs. In both setups of beliefs,
explicit formula for the market equilibrium prices of the risky assets are derived. As
a by-product of the consensus belief and equilibrium price formula, we show that the
standard Black’s zero-beta CAPM with homogeneous beliefs still holds with hetero-
geneous beliefs. The impact of the heterogeneity on the market equilibrium, mean
variance frontier and the efﬁciency of the optimal portfolios of the investors are ana-
lyzed. In particular, through some numerical examples, we show that, under market
aggregation, the biased belief (from the market belief) of an investor can push his/her
optimal portfolio below the equilibrium market frontier (although they are very close
to the efﬁcient frontier). This demonstrates that bounded rational investors may never
achieve their mean-variance efﬁciency (measured by the Sharpe ratio) in marker equi-
librium. If we refer the heterogeneous investors as fund managers and the market port-
folio as a market index, then our result offers a theoretic explanation on the empirical
ﬁnding that, according to the mean-variance criteria, managed funds under-perform
the market indices on average. We also offer an explanation on Miller’s proposition
that “divergence of opinion corresponds to lower future asset returns” and the subse-
quent empirical ﬁndings on this. Furthermore, the well known tangency relation of
the frontiers with and without risk-free asset under the homogeneous beliefs breaks
down under the heterogeneous beliefs, in particular when investors are heterogeneous
in variances. Adding a risk-free asset to the market with many risky assets can have
very complicated effect on the market in general. In the homogeneous market, the
expected return of the market portfolio is independent of the existence of the risk-free
asset which is in zero net supply. However, in the heterogeneous market, adding a risk-
free asset to the market with many risky assets leads to a higher expected return for thePORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 31
market portfolio in equilibrium. This result can be used to explain the risk premium
puzzle and the current ﬁnancial market crisis.
The implication of the heterogeneity on the market under different market condi-
tions is far more complicated than it seems and it deserves further study. It would be
interesting to extend the current static framework to a dynamic setting that so that the
intertemporal effect can be examined. It is also interesting to allow investors to learn
overtime from the market through various learning mechanisms, such as the Bayesian
updating rule, and the expectation feedback mechanisms. These extension will give
us a richer modelling environment and hopefully lead to a better understanding of the
phenomenons in our ﬁnancial market. We leave these issues to the future research.
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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF LEMMA 2.1






0 zi ¡ Wi
0] (33)
Since Ui(:) is concave, the optimal portfolio of agent i is determined by the ﬁrst order condition
@L
@zi
= 0 ) zi = µ¡1
i ­¡1
i [yi ¡ ¸ip0]: (34)
Substituting (34) into (3) yields (5), this completes the proof.
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3
On the one hand, from Deﬁnition 2.2, if the consensus belief Ba = (Ea(~ x);­a) exists, then




a [ya ¡ ¸¤
ap0]: (35)













This leads to the equilibrium price (13).
On the other hand, it follows from the individuals demand (4) and the market clearing con-










i [yi ¡ ¸¤
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a ya ¡ Iµ¡1
a ¸¤
a­¡1
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which leads to the same market equilibrium price (13). This shows that Ba = f­a;yag deﬁned
in (11) and (12) is the consensus belief. Inserting (13) into (4) will give the equilibrium optimal
portfolio (14) of investor i.
APPENDIX C. PROOF OF COROLLARY 2.4















Cova(~ xj; ~ Wm)]: (39)
It follows from (39) that ya;j ¡ ¸¤
ap0;j = µa









Cova(~ xj; ~ Wm):
Therefore
Ea(~ rj) ¡ (¸¤





Cova(~ xj; ~ Wm): (40)
It follows from Wm0 = 1
¸¤
azT








Using the deﬁnition of ¸¤
a in (41), we obtain
Ea(~ rm) ¡ (¸¤
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Dividing (40) by (42) leads to
Ea(~ rj) ¡ (¸¤
a ¡ 1)

































leading to the CAPM-like relation in (15).
APPENDIX D. THE SOLUTION TO THE OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO SELECTION PROBLEM IN
SUBSECTION 5.1
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subject to the wealth constraint ¼T






i 1 ¡ Wi;0]: (45)
Then the optimal portfolio of agent i is determined by the ﬁrst order conditions
@L
@¼i
= 0 ) ¼¤
i = µ¡1
i V ¡1
i (¹i ¡ ¸i1): (46)






APPENDIX E. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1
From equation (27) resulted from the aggregation condition, we know that the market equi-
































a (¹a ¡ ¸¤
a1); (48)
which corresponds to the equilibrium price speciﬁed in equation (30). This means that if every
investor in the market has the same belief Ba := (Va;¹a), then the equilibrium prices in the
homogeneous market are identical to the ones in the heterogeneous market. Hence one can
conclude that Ba is a consensus belief.
Now if we substitute Vi = P¡1
0 ­iP¡1
0 and ¹i = P¡1
o yi into equation (27), then we can
recover the expression for equilibrium prices in equation (8). This expression for equilibrium
prices corresponds to the consensus belief Ba := (­a;ya) in terms of asset payoffs, which
are deﬁned in Proposition 2.3. Then the equilibrium prices in terms of the consensus belief is
stated in equation (13) which is identical to (30).
Finally, we prove the ZHCAPM under the setup where investors form their beliefs about the
future asset returns. Deﬁne the expected market return under the consensus belief as Ea(~ rm) =
Ea(
~ Wm
Wm0 ¡ 1); where Wm0 = ¼T








From the fact that ~ Wm = ¼T
m(~ r + 1) and !T

















































Equation (52) leads to
¹a ¡ ¸¤
a1 = ¯(¹am ¡ ¸¤
a); (53)
leading to the relation in (32), which completes the proof.
APPENDIX F. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Example F.1. Let I = 2 and N = 3. Consider the set up in Table 1
Initial Wealth Risk Aversion Expected payoffs Variance/Covariance of payoffs
W1































TABLE 1. Market speciﬁcations and heterogeneous beliefs.
Assuming there is one share available for each asset, that is, zm = (1;1;1)T. Based on
the information in Table 1, we use equation (8) and Excel Solver to solve for the equilibrium




1 = 0:7894 for investor 1 and z¤
2 = (0:620;0:232;0:690)T and ¸¤
2 = 1:6520 for investor
2. Using Proposition 2.3, we construct the consensus belief Ba, the aggregate risk aversion
coefﬁcient µa, and the aggregate shadow price ¸¤
a, and obtain the result in Table 2. We then use
Total Market Initial Wealth Shadow Price Risk Aversion Expected payoffs Variance/Covariance of payoffs
Wm0 = 20 ¸¤















TABLE 2. The market consensus beliefs, shadow price and ARA.
the market equilibrium price to convert the consensus belief from payoffs to returns as follows.
Let P0 = diag[p0] = diag(5:6436;7:4328;6:9236) and
Ei(~ r) := P¡1
0 yi ¡ 1; Vi(~ r) := P¡1
0 ­iP¡1











i)1=2; i = 1;2;
Ea(~ r¤








P0zm; Ea(~ rm) := Ea(~ r)Twm;
¾a;m = (wT
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TABLE 3. Heterogeneous beliefs and the consensus belief, the indi-
vidual optimal and market portfolios in equilibrium, and the means and
standard deviations of these portfolios under heterogeneous and con-
sensus belies, respectively.
We then obtain the following results.
In the above deﬁnitions, Ei(r) and Vi(~ r) are the expected returns vectors and covariance
matrices in terms of asset returns for each investor.Subsequently, w¤
i are the individuals’ op-
timal portfolio weights, Ei(~ r¤
ip) and ¾¤
ip are the expected return and standard deviations of the
optimal portfolios of investors, respectively, under their subjective beliefs, Bi = (Ea(~ r¤
ip);¾a
ip).
Similarly, under the market belief Ba, wm is the market portfolio weight vector, Ea(~ rm) and
¾a;m are the market return and volatility under the market belief respectively. Finally ¯ is the
vector of beta coefﬁcients. According to these deﬁnitions, we obtain results in Table 3.
Example F.2. In this example, we re-examine the tangency relation and the mean-variance
efﬁciency of both individual optimal portfolios and the market portfolio with investors’ beliefs
formed in terms of asset returns, Bi = (Vi;Ei(~ r)). Assume I = 2 and N = 3, the risk-free
payoff is Rf. The initial wealth of investors, ARA coefﬁcients and market portfolio of risky
assets are assumed to be the same as in Example 4.1. Let Eo(~ r) = (0:169;0:258;0:413)T and
Vo = doCdo, where C is deﬁned in Example 4.1 and do = Diag[(0:1406;0:1180;0:2112)T]3.
To introduce heterogeneity into investors’ beliefs, we let Ei(~ r) = Eo(~ r)+±i1 and Vi = diCdi,
where di = do+²i(Diag(1)). Then we can study the geometric relationship between portfolio
frontiers with and without a risk-free asset by aggregating individual belief using Proposition
5.1. Risk-free asset is determined in equilibrium by assuming it is in net-zero supply. The
numerical results are plotted in Figure 4.
Example F.3. Let the number of investors I = 50, number of risky assets N = 3, and market
portfolio of risky assets is given by zm = (25;25;25)T (so that the average number of each
stock per investor stays at 0.5 as in the previous examples). Assume that there is a risk-free
asset with payoff Rf = 1:05. Investors’ initial wealth W0;i = $10, the ARA coefﬁcients
3(Eo(~ r);Vo) is the equivalent homogeneous beliefs to (yo;­o) in Example 4.1 in the sense that they
both generate identical equilibrium prices with all other variable being equal.PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS AND ZERO-BETA HETEROGENEOUS CAPM 37
µi » N(µo;¾2
µi) with µo = 3 and ¾µi = 0:3 for i = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;I. Let the beliefs be formed in
payoffs and consider two types of probability distributions for investors’ beliefs;
(i). yi = (1 + ±i)yo and ­i = DiCDi, Di = (1 + ²i)Do for i = 1;¢¢¢ ;50, where C, yo
and Do are deﬁned in Example 4.1 and ±i » N(0;¾2
±i) and ²i » N(0;¾2
²i);
(ii). yi = ±i + yo and ­i = DiCDi, Di = Diag[²i + (0:7933;0:8770;1:4622)T] for i =
1;¢¢¢ ;50, where ±i » MN(0;§±i) and ²i » MN(0;§²i) and §±i = ¾±iDiag[1]
and §²i = ¾²iDiag[1].
Symbols N and MN stand for normal distribution and multivariate normal distribution re-
spectively.
Example F.4. In this example, we repeat the analysis in Example F.3 with investors’ beliefs
formed in terms of asset returns. We again consider two types of probability distributions for
investors’ beliefs;
(iii). Ei(~ r) = ±i + Eo(~ r) and Vi = diCdi, di = ²iDiag[1] + do for i = 1;¢¢¢ ;50, where
Eo(~ r) and do are deﬁned in Example F.2, ±i » N(0;¾2
±i) and ²i » N(0;¾2
²i);
(iv). Ei(~ r) = ±i + Eo(~ r) and Vi = diCdi, di = Diag[²i + (0:1406;0:1180;0:2112)T] for
i = 1;¢¢¢ ;50, where ±i » MN(0;§±i) and ²i » MN(0;§²i), §±i = ¾±iDiag[1]
and §²i = ¾²iDiag[1].
Example F.5. In this example, we repeat the analysis in Example F.4, however we now con-
sider ﬁrst a market without a risk-free asset and then a market with a risk-free asset. In the
latter case, we assume that the risk-free asset is in net-zero supply and the risk-free rate is
determined in equilibrium by the following equation,
1 + rf =
1TV ¡1




Equation (54) comes from that the fact that total equity available in the market must equal to
the sum of investors’ wealth, that is ¼T
m1 = Wm0, where ¼m = Zp0